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Supreme audit institutions are an important pillar of governance and government resource 
management, particularly for controlling corruption. Francophone African countries inherited 
these from their former colonial power, France, but their role and function are limited. This paper 
argues that this is partly a legacy of their colonial experience. It investigates the Chamber of 
Accounts in Benin, the country’s supreme audit institution, using the lenses of Ekeh’s (1975) two 
publics and legitimacy theory. Nonetheless, Ekeh’s theory needed extending to incorporate 
changes affecting governance after Benin’s independence. The amorality of political officials, 
accepted by much of Benin society, rendered the institution largely ineffective in controlling 
corruption. Nevertheless, civil society organizations, donors, and the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund have attempted to redress this. Politicians and government officials responded by 
engaging in symbolic compliance to meet stakeholders’ expectations. A separate audit institution 
– the General Inspectorate of State – was established under the sole control of the President to gain 
external legitimacy and retain donors’ budget support, whilst persistent corruption and rising 
poverty continue. Benin’s auditing institutions have become empty crates, which sometimes 
facilitate rather than control corruption. 
 















Corruption is a major concern worldwide, but its consequences are more pronounced in developing 
countries, especially African ones, due partly to weak institutional safeguards and poor resource 
control (Blundo & de Sardan, 2003; Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010). It is a major cause of poverty 
(Akakpo, 2009; Bakre et al., 2006, 2007), and allegedly the greatest obstacle to social and 
economic development (Neu et al., 2013). Its prevalence in government and politics affects how 
economic and social life is organized and people’s compliance with rules and the law (Cooper et 
al., 2013). Its manifestations include contract inflation, understatement and misappropriation of 
assets, fraudulent financial reporting, looting of public coffers, bribery, and traffic of influence 
(Bakre, 2007; Lassou et al., 2018). In Africa, it creates ‘artificial poverty’ by channeling public 
resources to private pockets, thereby depriving citizens of essential public goods and services 
including basic health and education (Bakre, 2007). As the World Bank (WB)1 notes, the number 
of poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa “has been increasing… [and] in 2015, more extreme poor 
lived in that region than in the rest of the world combined”.2 Francophone Africa hosts some of 
the poorest – it provides 19% of African gross domestic product (GDP) – compared to 50% for 
Anglophone Africa, excluding South Africa (Jeune Afrique, 2012). However, researching 
corruption is difficult given its secretiveness and consequently the lack of a formal and systematic 
evidence trail (Sikka & Lehman, 2015).  
Reducing corruption, improving decisions, and monitoring aid effectiveness are cornerstones in 
international and donor-led development policies, e.g., The Paris Declaration (OECD, 2005) 
(Fyson, 2012). In the current good governance era (Hopper, 2017), anti-corruption initiatives 
include public administration reforms, of which accounting, particularly government audits, are 
integral (Andrews, 2013; Rahaman, 2009; Lassou et al., 2019). The latter often incorporate new 
public management auditing systems (Hood, 1995), local accounting capacity development and 
the adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) (Everett at al., 2007). 
Strengthening or establishing independent Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) have become central 
to fighting government sector corruption (Akakpo, 2009, 2015). The United Nation’s (UN) 
resolution A/C.2/69/L.25, 20 November 2014, emphasized their importance for accountability and 
transparency, and requested member countries and institutions, such as the WB and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to strengthen the mandate of SAIs. This often became a 
condition for financial support to developing countries (de Renzio, 2006; Lassou et al., 2014). 
According to the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (2007, p. 3), a SAI is a 
“public body of a state or supranational organisation which, however designated, constituted or 
organized, exercises, by virtue of law, or other formal action of the state or the supranational 
organisation, the highest public auditing function of that state or supranational organisation in an 
independent manner.” This definition emphasizes the SAI’s hierarchical level; its independence to 
discharge its mandates; and reporting to the parliament and ultimately the public (Akakpo, 2015; 
Dye, 2007). Audits by SAIs should, “create transparency, make… risk visible, and build… robust 
                                                          
1 A list of acronyms is in Appendix 1. 
2 See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/immersive-story/2018/10/17/going-above-and-beyond-to-end-poverty-
new-ways-of-measuring-poverty-shed-new-light-on-the-challenges-ahead [Assessed 10/05/2019]. 
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and effective internal controls to contribute specifically to the prevention of corruption in line with 
the spirit of the United Nations Convention against Corruption ... SAIs create a climate of 
transparency that largely contributes to detecting and more importantly preventing corruption” 
[UN, 2013, p. i). 
How a SAI is constituted affects its independence and effectiveness (Akakpo, 2009; Gendron et 
al., 2001). In most countries it is one body (e.g., Office of the Auditor-General or Court of 
Accounts), but Francophone Africa elected to have two possible types – the Court/Chamber of 
Accounts (Cour/Chambre des Comptes) within the judiciary and, unique in Africa, the General 
Inspectorate of State [Inspection Générale d'État3 (IGE)], similar to an inspectorate within French 
African colonial administrations (Gueye, 2010; Ndiaye, 1993; Wynne & Lassou, 2015). The IGE 
has no parallel in France or other industrialised Francophone countries. It is part of the executive 
branch of government and is accountable only to the President. Benin’s Constitution nominates 
the Chamber of Accounts as its SAI, but presidents have also mandated an IGE to fight corruption 
(African Minds, 2016). The Chamber of Accounts should review finance laws, conduct 
performance audits, and audit the accounts of central and local governments, public enterprises, 
and government agencies and institutions. It reports to the President, Parliament, and the public in 
two phases: reviewing budget out-turns and its judgement of the accounts (Lassou et al., 2019). 
The IGE conducts internal audits but it now can also audit the accounts of public enterprises, 
government institutions and agencies following an audit manual and standards determined by the 
IGE. It reports exclusively to the President. 
This prompted us to investigate why these two institutions operate side-by-side, how is this 
institutional cohabitation sustained, and why does corruption still thrive in Benin? Benin is often 
cited as a model of governance, particularly in West Africa, due to its stable democratic credentials 
and peaceful transfer of political powers (Gisselquist, 2008) but few citizens have significantly 
benefitted from this (Akakpo, 2009). Like many African countries (Bakre, 2006, 2007; Blundo & 
de Sardan, 2003; Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010; Osei-Tutu et al., 2010), corruption in Benin abounds, 
and government sector scandals frustrate development initiatives (Adoun & Awoudo, 2008, 2016; 
Akakpo, 2009) to the point where: “the unit of embezzlement of public resources has become the 
billion and corruption has now been carried out with both hands using a shovel rather than a spoon 
as during [the late] Kérékou’s regime [pre-2006]. Basically, the practice is tolerated to some 
extent” (Damiba & Badet, 2016, p. 28). 
Prior accounting research has attributed corruption in Africa to neopatrimonialism and 
neocolonialism (discussed and defined later) (Bakre, 2007, Hopper 2017; Lassou & Hopper, 2016; 
Lassou et al., 2019). Understanding this and the role of accounting therein needs to recognise how 
colonialism ruptured traditional governance in Africa. Its ramifications are comparable in scale to 
those of the Industrial and French Revolutions in Europe. It prevented African leaders establishing 
a hegemony conducive to nation-building. Whilst neopatrimonialism exists in Benin, we doubted 
                                                          
3 The exact designation may vary across countries or even within the same country over time (e.g., Benin’s IGE 




that public officials’ and politicians’ corruption significantly benefitted their tribal, ethnic or 
regional groups, as neopatrimonialism intimates. Many leaders’ and bureaucrats’ villages and 
communities remain poor and receive little benefit (e.g. improved health services, safe water 
supply, sanitation, education) from their kin misappropriating government resources (Bierschenk 
et al., 2003; Blundo & de Sardan, 2003; Lassou et al., 2014). Hence this study turned to Ekeh’s 
(1975) ‘two publics’ theory, used by Goddard et al. (2016) when studying the government’s and 
non-government organisations’ (NGO) accounting in Tanzania, to examine how Beninese 
accounting institutions, namely SAIs, may curb or facilitate corruption in the government sector, 
why corruption persists, and whether the illicit building of personal fortunes by politicians and 
senior public officials can be attributed to how colonialism shaped popular attitudes to the handling 
of state resources. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the 
background literature; Section 3 presents the theoretical framework; Section 4 describes the 
research methods; Sections 5 and 6 present and discuss the findings; and Section 7 provides 
conclusions. 
2. Accounting and corruption  
Some qualitative research on corruption and accounting practices focuses on accounting systems 
(including internal controls) and its practitioners. In Canada, Neu et al. (2013) found that the 
federal and provincial (Quebec) governments’ accounting and audit controls constrained but also 
enabled corruption, aided by ‘skillful’ accounting by practitioners within criminal networks. Also 
in Quebec, a culture of collusion between elected government and municipal officials, and 
construction industry members made corruption a norm, reproduced in discourses of ‘everyone is 
doing it’; and despite numerous controls, regulations, and procurement contract monitoring 
organizations, corruption endures (Courtois & Gendron, 2017, p. 37). However, Neu et al. (2015) 
argue that individuals may internalise values embedded in internal controls (including audits) and 
become ethical subjects, though critics argue this neglects corruption’s supply side, whereby 
businesspersons pursue financial gain irrespective of ethical values. Thus, however desirable 
internal controls and auditing may appear, they “are unlikely to make a significant dent in corrupt 
practices to secure government contracts” (Sikka & Lehman, 2015, p. 62). A distinguishing feature 
of these studies is that they view corruption as an act of social and moral deviancy, whereas most 
research focuses on how accounting controls can curb this (following fraud triangle theory), which 
treats the symptoms not the root causes of corruption. This study is similarly interested in the 
norms governing corruption, not only of its perpetrators, but also of the wider public in an African 
setting. 
Studies of accounting’s role in curbing corruption in Africa are scant. In six Nigerian cases, 
professional accounting associations and auditors failed to control corporate corruption costing 
billions of US dollars: unethical accountants falsified documents, financial reports, and security 
sales. Despite a formal commitment to serve the public interest, accountants were “mere tools in 
the hands of perpetrators of fraud” (Bakre, 2007, p. 282). They have helped multinationals and 
government officials misappropriate Nigerian oil revenues (Bakre, 2006). Adopting IPSASs has 
not stemmed this (Bakre & Lauwo, 2016), e.g. despite IPSAS 17 stipulating fair value accounting 
in property valuations, historical cost accounting was used to undervalue government property 
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sold to politicians and their cronies (Bakre et al., 2017). Despite Nigeria being one of few African 
countries adopting extensive government accounting reforms, especially sophisticated anti-
corruption rules, laws and institutions, many remain unenacted, thus corruption continues (Iyoha 
& Oyerinde, 2010). Such results are not confined to Nigeria in West Africa. A WB-led reform of 
the Ghana Food Distribution Corporation’s financial reporting did not improve accountability or 
performance but continued to serve patronage politics and corruption (Uddin & Tsamenyi, 2005). 
In Benin, local civil servants developed and implemented a new local government accounting 
system to improve accountability and redress corruption but political and administrative 
interference reduced the gains achieved (Lassou et al., 2018). In Francophone Africa, a 
government accounting system imported from France that replaced an indigenously developed one 
failed to improve reporting and accountability or reduce corruption. The switch, under dubious 
circumstances involving local and French government officials, was attributed to 
neopatrimonialism and neocolonialism4 (Lassou & Hopper, 2016). 
Corruption can occur anywhere – in developed or developing (African) countries, though it 
appears more pervasive in the latter, arguably due to different institutional safeguards, cultures, 
histories, and socio-political systems. Prior research tends to depict corruption as deviant behavior 
at odds with local social norms (Malsch et al., 2012; Neu et al., 2013), e.g. its normalization is 
confined to those involved (Courtois & Gendron, 2017). However, corruption is widespread 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (Stiglitz, 2002), and is often socially accepted beyond the 
perpetrators’ circle. Moreover, African studies challenge assumptions that anti-corruption laws 
and regulations are “universal and uncontested” (Cooper et al., 2013, p. 440; Courtois & Gendron, 
2017), have similar outcomes irrespective of context, and if legislated they will be enacted. These 
observations reinforced our desire to study Benin’s SAI, an institution expected to mitigate 
corruption and monitor government expenditure that transpired to be an empty shell, and how 
socio-historical explanations of contemporary governance within African studies can explain this. 
The study builds on prior studies on the control of corruption in Benin (Lassou et al., 2018; 2020), 
which attributed its persistence to neopatrimonialism (Lassou, 2017) and neocolonialism (Lassou 
et al., 2019), by examining why corruption is socially tolerated and how colonial roots have 
contributed to this. 
3. Civic and primordial publics: Beyond neopatrimonialism 
Pre-colonial governance in Africa rested on the traditional and personal authority of kings or chiefs 
whose decisions and legitimacy followed customs. Traditional authority was expected to foster 
community members’ wellbeing, not merely the chief’s personal self-enrichment. To gain trust 
and legitimacy leaders had to allocate collective resources and services to meet community needs, 
and preserve law and order (Ray, 2003; Ray & Reddy, 2003; Richards, 2016). Lingering beliefs in 
                                                          
4 Neocolonialism maintains the dominance of, and exploitation by, Western actors (often former colonial powers) 




traditional authority persist today, though often leaders exploit it through neopatrimonialism 
(Cammack, 2007; Hopper, 2017; Lassou, 2017; Médard, 1983). 
Neopatrimonialism combines Weber’s delineation of traditional (patrimonial) and legal-rational 
bureaucratic authority (Erdmann & Engel, 2007). In African countries, despite government 
institutions and positions being formally constituted on rational-legal principles, patrimonial 
relationships based on personal, ethnic and clientelist ties often dominate political and 
administrative decisions, not invariably toward public service but often for private or political gain, 
(Bruhns, 2012). Thus, the public and private spheres become mixed and corruption abounds (Bach 
& Gazibo, 2012). If some proceeds go to the leaders’ ethnic or community group this may be 
perceived as legitimate. Even if some of the electorate disagrees, it may be rational for them to 
accept and seek illicit benefits from politicians from their tribe or region (Hopper, 2017).  
However, neo-patrimonialism does not fully explain the root causes and widespread acceptance of 
corruption in Africa. Ekeh (1975) laid the foundations for work on neopatrimonialism in a way 
that recognized the legacy of colonialism. Colonial ideologies emphasised: a civilizing mission to 
save Africans from backwardness and inter-tribal wars; that Africans were the principal 
beneficiaries of colonialism (which downplayed the role of taxes and the colonizer’s surpluses 
produced by indigenous labour) (Huillery, 2014); and the need to selectively assimilate educated 
Africans, deemed superior to ‘native’ Africans loyal to local traditions and culture, into ‘civilized’ 
modern European culture (Osaghae, 2006). Educated Africans filled government positions and 
upon independence became political leaders (Arendt, 1976; Verschave, 1998). Alongside this, 
“Colonial regimes [fostered] tribalism by … trying to channel all political and economic dealings 
between individuals and the state through the medium of ‘tribal authorities’” (Leys, 1975, p. 199). 
Hence tribal affiliation became the basis for distributing power and resources.  
Ekeh (1975) argued that colonialism created two publics (primordial and civic), rather than one as 
in the West, resulting in politics marked by ethnicity, nepotism, and corruption. The primordial 
public includes ancient groupings, ties, sentiments and activities within ethnic groups, and 
communal and village associations (including community-based NGOs), that provide essential 
public goods (e.g., clean water, communal health and education). Members have a strong moral 
stance and sense of duty regarding the communal good, manifested in their behavior in the private 
realm. The African populace is not inherently corrupt, especially when acting within the primordial 
public (Moreno, 2002): corruption at the citizen level is lower in Africa than in many other regions 
(Hopper, 2017).  
The civic public includes members of institutions formally governed by legal-rational rules 
(Osaghae, 2006), e.g. the military, executive, legislature, civil service, judiciary, and police. The 
state is its bedrock but not exclusively. Ekeh (1975, p. 92) identifies the civic public with: “… 
popular politics in post-colonial Africa”, claiming it is, “amoral and lacks the generalized moral 
imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public realm.” Civic public 
members can experience dialectical tensions because their governance activities span both publics: 
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they must reconcile the high morality and ethical standards expected in the primordial public with 
the amoral culture of the civic public, namely that it is legitimate to rob civic resources to 
strengthen the primordial public (Ekeh, 1975, p. 108), whereas they actually do so to primarily 
enrich themselves. 
Ekeh attributes this to African’s colonial experiences. African leaders during independence 
struggles accepted many colonialist precepts justifying their rule but claimed greater competency 
in executing them. Post-independence they often became national leaders. Colonialists had 
inculcated widespread popular beliefs that their systems and advice are superior, and as the new 
leaders lacked traditional legitimacy, they created self-serving theories reproducing colonial 
ideologies. For example, "The African bourgeois, born out of the colonial experience, is very 
uncomfortable with the idea of being different from his former colonizers in matters regarding 
education, administration or technology" (Ekeh, 1975, p. 102). Simultaneously, they attacked 
traditional bases of legitimacy using colonialist divide and rule strategies based on colonially 
constructed ethnic categories, partly to stymie rival claims of traditional authorities. They 
portrayed themselves to electorates as patrons that channel public resources, not just financial but 
also employment and social goods, such as village wells and roads, to their tribe.5 In the process, 
African states became “burdened by bureaucracies whose appointments are made according to 
tests of loyalty, and which ineffectively account for public funds siphoned off” (Cammack, 2007, 
pp. 601-602). Thus, some traditional obligations, albeit reconstituted according to colonial 
tribalism, persist legitimately in the primordial public and illegitimately in the civic public 
(Adabweni, 2016). However, why have so few government resources trickled down to the 
populace and why do they often tolerate this? 
Colonisers inculcated a culture of continuing gratefulness. They presented public services and 
goods (such as roads, schools, health facilities, bridges), as gifts or benefits - not things financed 
by taxation or colonisers’ yields from exploiting local resources (Huillery, 2014). This created 
beliefs that recipients have no right to demand the giver to account for what is given, and that the 
state’s wealth is self-generated and inexhaustible. Moreover, efforts of anti-colonialist leaders to 
discredit and sabotage the colonial regime through tax evasion, strikes, insubordination to 
authority, and their amorality and pursuit of colonial means of rule to gain legitimation once they 
gained power, exacerbated popular beliefs that the state is exploitative, distinct from citizens, and 
thus it is legitimate to illicitly plunder its resources given the opportunity to do so (Osaghae, 2006). 
The state is seen as an ‘Eldorado’ (Verschave, 2000), hence many primordial public members 
believe, with no moral compunction, that it is acceptable for public servants to gain (mostly 
unethically) from public office (Akakpo, 2009; Verschave, 1998, 2004), i.e. the, “ideologies of 
legitimation invented alike by the alien colonial rulers of Africa and their African successors have 
given credence to the myth among the ordinary African that the civic public can never be 
impoverished… [A] lucky citizen of the civic public gains from the civic public, but enjoys 
escaping giving anything in return whenever he can.” (Ekeh, 1975, p. 108). Thus, many primordial 
and civic public members alike see the civic public in amoral terms, “from which one seeks to 
gain” or steal as much as possible, like their colonial predecessors” (Ekeh, 1975, p. 100), and many 
                                                          
5 According to Ekeh (1975) the civic public’s emergence created ‘modern’ African tribalism. Of course, tribalism was 
prevalent in traditional African society prior to colonialism but here it means, "where there is conflict between 
segments of the African bourgeoisie regarding the proportionate share of the resources of the civic public to 
differentiated primordial publics" (Ekeh, 1975:109). 
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Africans, particularly those whose primary loyalty is to the primordial public, view the state as a 
transactional reality that reproduces perpetual transactional politics (Adabenwi, 2016). Civic 
public members may make token distributions of resources to their villages and communities, but 
they remain poor and lack basic public services and infrastructure due to the more general 
diversion of public resources into private pockets (Foutoyet, 2009; Joseph, 1976; Martin, 1995; 
Otusanya et al., 2017).  
Effective government accounting, however defined (e.g., transaction recording, control and 
performance evaluation, auditing) is challenging for an amoral civic public (Ghartey, 1985). To 
keep enjoying the millions of aid dollars and citizens’ acceptance of their authority, politicians and 
bureaucrats must show compliance with institutional and accounting prescriptions albeit 
nominally. Legitimacy theory asserts that organisations must meet the expectations of external 
parties to survive (Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000), e.g., meeting the expectations of donors framed 
accounting practices in the Tanzanian public sector (Goddard et al., 2016). However, “For an 
organization seeking to be perceived as legitimate it is not the actual conduct of the organization 
that is important, it is what society collectively knows or perceives about the organization’s 
conduct that shapes legitimacy” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p. 324). For example, the Ghana 
government adopted a financial audit scheme to fight fraud and financial mismanagement in the 
government sector, despite its inappropriateness, to show foreign donors that the ‘necessary’ 
accountability mechanisms to manage the funds they provided were in place – the emphasis was 
on the ‘doing’ as perceived rather than achieving the desired outcome (Rahaman, 2009). Our study 
of Beninese governments’ attempts to gain legitimacy similarly concerns perceptions, unlike much 
accounting research that only examines how legitimacy stems from actual activities and operations 
(e.g., Collier, 2004; Rahaman et al., 2004). Incorporating legitimacy theory complemented Ekeh’s 
work by drawing attention to how amoral civic public members bolster perceptions that they are 
meeting expectations, whilst frustrating development of a functioning and effective SAI. 
Ekeh provided a historical account of contemporary socio-political and economic processes 
(Adabenwi, 2016). Nevertheless, as more contemporary researchers have noted, it requires 
updating to accommodate African governance changes post-independence that were neglected by 
Ekeh. Wars, economic crises, military rule have allegedly increased normlessness in both publics 
(Onuoha, 2014). Moreover, African countries often depend on powerful international financial 
institutions, e.g., the WB, IMF; bilateral development agencies, e.g. USAID; and NGOs, for 
financial assistance (Hopper et al., 2017). We label these the ‘external public’ in our analysis. They 
often request recipients of aid and loans to reform their financial governance and regulatory 
institutions (Andrews, 2013; de Renzio, 2006; Schiavo-Campo, 2009; WB, 2002; Wynne & 
Lawrence, 2012). These often include the adoption of ‘modern’ governance institutions (from the 
Western perspective) such as anti-corruption laws and agencies, a SAI, a free and independent 
media, and active civil society involvement (Abrahamsen, 2012; Onohua, 2014). Also, when Ekeh 
formulated his ideas, the role of civil society was neglected in African studies, though later he 
placed it within the primordial public (Osaghae, 2006). Indigenous NGOs fall within this sphere, 
though those supported by foreign donors arguably span the external and primordial publics. 
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Lastly, it cannot be assumed that all civil and primordial public members tolerate civic public 
amorality or that all civic public members are amoral. Increased education and urbanization may 
be changing attitudes.  
Four central research questions emerged from the above. How have SAIs developed in Benin post-
independence? Have they been effective, especially in curbing corruption? What is the nature and 
scale of corruption within Benin’s political and government institutions? And, does Ekeh’s thesis, 
especially regarding the lingering ramifications of colonialism, help explain this? 
4. Research methods 
This longitudinal case study of Benin’s SAI, the Chamber of Accounts, and the IGE uses data 
spanning 1966 to 2018 (but some issues that emerged precede 1966). Letters requesting research 
access went to the SAI, the IGE and the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), the oldest and most 
active control institution in Benin, and donors involved in accounting reforms in Benin (the WB, 
European Union (EU), and IMF); and governance advocacy NGOs. No formal responses came 
before the field visit by the lead author, despite follow ups. Additional relevant organisations (e.g. 
GIZ, ALCRER6, the Treasury and Accounting Department (TAD), and another anti-corruption 
organisation7) were approached during field visits. Eventually, thirty semi-structured interviews8 
were conducted with officials from the Chamber of Accounts (7); IGE (4) and IGF (4); civil society 
organisations (NGOs) (6); donors – WB (2), EU (1) and GIZ (1)9 – the TAD (3); a retired 
government accountant; and a former MP and member of Parliament’s Finance Committee. 
Appendix 2 gives details of the interviewees and the code attached to their quotations in the results 
section. The main interview themes are provided below.10 The interviewees are not representative 
of the Beninese population but are an educated elite, most of whom, but not all, have sought 
accounting reforms. The donors were not Beninese, though they had extensive experience of 
Beninese society. The public officials fall primarily within Benin’s civic public though many have 
been and may still identify with the primordial public. Thus, our conclusions on the primordial and 
civic publics’ activities and attitudes draw largely on top-down perceptions of elites but given their 
background and experiences, their perceptions have credibility. However, interviewees from civil 
                                                          
6 Association de Lutte Contre le Racisme, l’Ethnocentrisme et le Régionalisme, a Beninese NGO. 
7 Given the nature of their partners, the respondent requested not to disclose the name of the organization. 
8 They include 6 interviews conducted during fieldwork on related issues by the lead author in 2012. 
9 Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) is a German development agency. 
10 These covered why and how the Chamber of Accounts and the IGE were created: for what role/function; what 
model was drawn upon and why; the extent to which and how they oversee/monitor the use of and accounting for 
public resources, control corruption and hold the government accountable, and its effect/impact; the challenges they 
face in executing their remit and why; relationships between the two institutions and how this has evolved; why are 
there two institutions - the Chamber of Accounts and the IGE - and what benefits and challenges this provides/poses; 
which institution has had more impact and why; what major reforms/changes each institution has been subjected to 
and why, how, and by whom; which donors are involved and how; what other actors are involved and how; and lessons 
learned from the experience. 
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society organisations purportedly represent civil society and thus provide some bottom-up input 
on the civic and primordial publics’ attitudes and activities. 
The first visit in 2015 focused on the Chamber of Accounts, the IGF, the WB and three NGOs. 
Only two key officials in the Chamber and the IGF respectively were accessible. The 2018 visit 
was more fruitful, but it proved impossible to interview many respondents given the subject 
matter’s political sensitivity. To build trust, interviewees were informed about the ethical protocol 
regarding anonymity, confidentiality and being able to contact the Ethics Office of the lead 
author’s university if dissatisfied. A helpful factor was the lead author’s prior work in Benin on 
related subjects. Most interviews were recorded, but sometimes subjects objected – in either case, 
notes were taken. Informal discussions provided details not captured in formal interviews. 
Documents11 helped augment or corroborate evidence from interviews. These included: legislative 
documents, control/audit reports, civil society reports on governance and development initiatives, 
donors’ evaluation/assessment notes and reports, histories of accounting and control institutions, 
and newspaper articles. Inter alia, they helped overcome the absence of primary data for the initial 
years of the institutions examined (Hazgui & Gendron (2015).  
After gaining familiarity with the interview and documentary data, relevant parts were coded 
manually. The first codes were derived top-down based on aspects of the theoretical framework, 
namely elements of the civic public (e.g., colonial legacy, corruption and amorality, and tribalism), 
legitimacy, and good governance (e.g., civil society engagement and control of corruption). Then, 
a bottom-up reading and coding of the data followed. This identified some themes/categories (i.e., 
decoupling and legal-rational bureaucracy) not within the original theoretical framework. Rather 
than treating these as independent categories, they were integrated into the main categories. For 
example, decoupling was incorporated into legitimacy, and amorality linked to control of 
corruption and good governance. Legal-rational bureaucracy, the official basis for establishing the 
SAI, the IGE and subsequent reforms, spanned most categories. This means-ends decoupling 
analysis (Bromley & Powell, 2012) helped capture discrepancies between policies, their 
implementation, and outcomes (e.g., corruption and poverty). No hierarchical order was made. 
Diagram 1 provides an overview of the coding. 
[Insert Diagram 1 here] 
Three major events: independence (1960); the new Constitution (1990); and the resuscitation of 
the IGE (2006) were identified as significant breakpoints marking three time periods, 1960-1990, 
1990-2006, and 2006 to 2019. The data was then organized chronologically. The results were 
consistent over the three periods despite changes in events.  
5. Context and the colonial roots of Benin’s SAI and civic public amorality: 1960-1990  
Benin, formerly Dahomey, a French colony from the late 19th century, is situated in West Africa. 
Its population of circa 11 million contains diverse ethnic groups that practice various religions, 
                                                          
11 Appendix 3 lists the main primary documents used. 
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mainly Christian, Islamic and traditional. It remains severely underdeveloped and ranks among the 
world's poorest countries, although it has experienced economic growth over recent years. Most 
of the population rely on subsistence agriculture. Benin is one of Africa's largest cotton producers 
which accounts for 40% of Benin's GDP and 80% of its exports. There is also production of 
textiles, palm products, and cocoa beans. There has been a relatively free media; and freedom of 
assembly and association, protected by legal and constitutional provisions, which have been 
generally, but not always, respected by the government.12 Since 1990 Benin has had a moderately 
robust democracy with some freedom of speech, fair elections and peaceful transitions of power.  
Benin gained independence on August 1st, 1960. After a short period of political stability (1960-
1963) various coups d’état ensued until 1972, with dubious elections marked by tribalism and 
corrupt political competition. From 1972, an authoritarian one-party Marxist-Leninist 
regime assumed power. Financial and macroeconomic mismanagement and corruption 
precipitated a crisis and unprecedented social unrest. The regime collapsed in 1989 (Allen, 1992). 
Under pressure from external (donors) and domestic (pro-democratic) groups a new Constitution 
was adopted in 1990, which marked the beginning of the current liberal democracy. Benin became 
the first African country to successfully transition from dictatorship to a pluralistic political 
system. There have been six presidential and eight parliamentary elections. In one the incumbent 
President lost and transferred power – a rarity in West Africa. Thus, Benin is often hailed as a 
model democracy in West Africa, though the Economist Intelligence Unit label it a ‘hybrid 
regime’13 and others a ‘minimal democracy’ (Gisselquist, 2008, p. 808). The President heads the 
state, the government and exercises executive power within a multi-party system which until 
recently contained many small parties. Legislative power is vested in the government and the 
legislature and formally the Judiciary is independent of both.  
An audit institution for Benin was unnecessary during colonialism because, “the French were in 
charge …and they assumed the audit of the accounts. Our resources were part of that of the French 
community. Thus, the Trésor Français… [and the French] Court of Accounts oversaw the audit of 
accounts.” [CC001]. An inspectorate, the IGE’s predecessor, in Dakar (Senegal) exercised internal 
control, and financial and administration throughout French West Africa, including Benin (Gueye, 
2010; Ndiaye, 1993). Prior to granting Benin independence, the colonial administration created 
the Service de l’Inspection des Finances (Inspectorate of Finance) in 1960,14 which became 
Benin’s main accounting institution (Inspection Générale des Finances). In 1963, it was placed 
within the Ministry of Finance15 and later was split into the IGE under the Presidency, and the IGF 
within the Ministry of Finance. Unethical behavior and corruption in the early years after 
independence created distrust, especially between Parliament and the executive, which 
precipitated demands for an institution to monitor the executive’s use of public resources (Lassou, 
                                                          
12 https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/benin/ [Acccessed 14/08/2019]. 
13 Benin Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018. 
14 Decree No.49/PCM/MF 
15 Decrees No. 7/PR/MFT – 19/01/1963 and No. 63-210/PR/MFT – 03/05/1963 
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2017). Hence, in 1966 a SAI,16 the Chamber of Accounts, was created based on the ‘Napoleonic 
model’ [CC003]. This was, according to interviewees, a ‘French’ proposal for the former colonial 
power retained considerable influence (Joseph, 1976; Lassou et al., 2019; Verschave, 1998). Its 
advice was widely perceived as superior, and if adopted, it could increase the government’s 
legitimacy, consistent with Ekeh’s assertion that, “the African bourgeoisie had no basis of 
legitimacy independent of colonialism” (Ekeh, 1975, p. 103). At first glance, this suggests an 
importation of Western governance institutions reflecting beliefs in the superiority of Western and 
especially French goods and services inculcated by the colonialist ideology, as noted by Ekeh 
(1975), but the Chamber of Accounts did not conform to institutional structures in France. A senior 
auditor claimed the colonial advisors:  
felt that we had limited resources, financial … and intellectual … and they found the 
formula consisting of creating a Court which they called Supreme Court… within which 
they introduced the Chambre des Comptes [Chamber of Accounts] rather than an 
institution on its own… it was just a creation of the colonialist. Otherwise, there is no 
Supreme Court in France! Supreme Court exists in the USA but that is of a different nature 
from what was created for us.” [CC003].  
A senior major anti-corruption NGO official claimed, “it was a bad option” [CSO01], for despite 
the stipulation for its annual reports17 to go to Benin’s President, the National Assembly 
(Parliament) and the public, Presidents could bypass Parliament in the budgetary process (African 
Development Bank, 2005). The Chamber of Accounts was one of four Chambers of the Supreme 
Court18 and thus part of the judiciary. The Supreme Court is the highest Court in Benin. Its mandate 
extended to all judiciary matters and it consisted of a Judiciary Chamber, an Administrative 
Chamber, a Constitutional Chamber, and the Chamber of Accounts. Its constitutional mandate was 
transferred to the Constitutional Court created post-1990. Its decisions and judgements are final 
and cannot be appealed. It is independent but reports to the Executive and to the Parliament. The 
work of the Chamber of Accounts initially sat uncomfortably with those of the other Chambers 
that concentrated on interpreting the law, an insignificant function for the Chamber of Accounts. 
Thus, as a senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts recounted, although, “the judiciary… effectively 
exercised their mission …of examining the decisions rendered by the ordinary courts of law… the 
Chamber of Accounts didn’t practically function until the National Conference [in 1990].” 
[CC003]. The President of the Republic appointed senior auditors without due consideration to the 
SAI’s mission or needs. Interviewees commented that they were, “judiciary magistrates with only 
a law background [DON03] [but] … were put in charge of a financial function [CSO01] [and] … 
                                                          
16 The public accounts examined/audited by the Chamber of Accounts include: the Compte de Gestion (financial 
accounts) of central and local governments, the Projet de Loi de Règlement (draft budget out-turn), the Compte 
Général de l’Administration Centrale (general account of the central administration). In addition, the Chamber is 
required to conduct performance audit on government programmes and special investigations as requested by 
Parliament and the President of the Republic and carry out an electoral campaign audit following each election 
(Constitution, articles 99 and 112; Law No.2004-07). Their aim is to ensure the proper use of public resources in 
discharging government functions and when corruption in any form is identified, the Chamber can issue appropriate 
sanctions. In practice these did not materialize (Adoun and Awoudo, 2008). 
17 The Constitution and Law No.2004-07. 
18 Ordinance No.21/PR. 
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they [the magistrates] put in place processes that prevented those who would want to support the 
Chamber from progressing [CC003]. Interviewees at the Chamber recalled that then the SAI had 
only two Conseillers (senior auditors) (Akakpo, 2010), both with a legal background and no 
accounting or finance training or experience, and its auditing focused on legal documents (Akakpo, 
2010) rather than holding the government accountable (Damiba & Badet, 2016).  
From 1972 to 1989 corruption and mismanagement across all government sectors increased 
(Akakpo, 2009, 2010; Gisselquist, 2008) for, as a former President of the Chamber of Accounts 
claimed, “Public managers … had no obligation to account because there was no gatekeeper, that 
is, a functioning Chamber of Accounts, … they managed without any fear. And that, to a large 
extent, led to the widely observed mess in the management of public resources, particularly the 
development of corruption.” [CC001]. Virtually no-one controlled how governments used public 
resources (Gisselquist, 2008). The IGE largely remained dormant until 2006 (Damiba & Badet, 
2016) and although a SAI was created it had an inappropriate remit, staff, and structural location, 
and its auditing was ineffective, inappropriate and its control of corruption was minimal. As it did 
little, it had little place in public discourse, and was left unreformed until 1990 (Akakpo, 2010), 
when the Conférence Nationale des Forces Vives de la Nation recognized the need for such an 
institution in the new Constitution (Articles 52 and 99).  
5. The SAI post-regime change - Emergence of tribalism and resistance to reform: 
1990-2006 
The 1990 National Conference partly attributed the financial, economic and social crisis, and 
widespread corruption in Benin to the Chamber of Account’s dysfunctionality. A former President 
of the Chamber with extensive knowledge of events recalled: ‘‘we went to the National Conference 
and fortunately people [i.e. Conference members] noted the unfortunate consequences [corruption 
and mismanagement] of the non-functioning of the Chamber of Accounts and inserted it in the 
Constitution’ [CC001). However, the new Constitution (article 125) re-affirmed its position within 
the Supreme Court, and the profile and number of Conseillers remained similar (Akakpo, 2009, 
2010). The Constitution (article 134) stipulated that, “Presidents of Chambers and Conseillers are 
nominated among magistrates and senior lawyers with at least fifteen years of professional 
experience.” Nevertheless, the position of Vérificateurs, (auditors with a public finance 
background) was created. In 1992 the Supreme Court President recruited five Vérificateurs to 
complement the two Conseillers [senior auditors]. They instigated some financial audits, not on 
government accounts, but on small government projects, hoping it would stimulate the government 
to produce accounts. To signal this in 1995 the Chamber issued, “a provisional condemnation of 
the Head of the TAD for the failure to transmit government accounts to the Chamber of Accounts 
within the prescribed period… knowing that the accounts were not produced in the first place.” 
[CC001]. This encouraged the TAD to produce government accounts for 1998 and 1999 (Akakpo, 
2010) but when the President nominated a new Supreme Court President from his ethnic group, 
attempts to make the TAD produce auditable accounts ceased. A former President of the Chamber 
of Accounts recalled how, 
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“Among the five auditors who were recruited, …three met the conditions to be nominated 
Conseillers [senior auditors]. And they were very hardworking… So, when this President came 
what did he do? He took the one who is from the same region [i.e. ethnic group] and nominated 
him Conseiller. The second one who is from a different region, Mono, he sent him to the Parquet 
[the ordinary law courts]. And the third one who was the first Vérificateur [auditor] recruited – 
and who took the initiative to approach the other two and told them ‘please come, the conditions 
are not great now but if we work hard… improvements will follow to make the conditions more 
interesting… This is a challenge that we have to overturn’ – he left him as a Vérificateur and didn’t 
nominate him… This Vérificateur is also from another region, Porto-Novo.” [CC001]. 
A former senior auditor in the Chamber commented, “you nominate those you want, not 
necessarily those who deserve to be nominated.” [CC006]. The Supreme Court President proposes 
candidates19 and can use any criteria, though sometimes the President of Chamber of Accounts 
may recommend candidates. In this instance, tribal membership was the criteria according to a 
senior auditor, and he “dismantled the emerging dynamic team that started to bring the activities 
of the Chamber of Accounts to life.” [CC003] The sole auditor nominated could do little and the 
team’s motivation declined. Interviewees claimed they became “simple observers” and apparently 
the auditor not nominated was “traumatized for life.” [CC003].  
In 1994 the regional organisation (UEMOA)20 responded to demands from donors, and sectors of 
civil society for anti-corruption initiatives. A UEMOA treaty (article 68) recommended member 
countries (including Benin) to establish a Court of Accounts but a directive21 was not issued until 
2000. It stated that: “there will be no sound management of public finances without an effective a 
posteriori control conducted by an independent financial jurisdiction with extended power and 
investigative capabilities. Member states must establish autonomous Courts of Accounts by 31 
December 2002”. In Benin, this meant converting the Chamber of Accounts into a Court of 
Accounts, a separate institution with stronger independence and specialized staff and auditors, 
unlike the Chamber of Accounts. Civil society organisations welcomed this for, “rising 
embezzlements… billions of inflated government expenditures without anything coming out for the 
benefit of the population… made us … realise that we need a functional supreme audit institution 
in order to bring people to account. [CSO05]. Nevertheless, Benin ignored the UEMOA directive 
and retained the Chamber of Accounts as its SAI.  
Following donor pressure, Benin finally produced government accounts in 2000 (Lassou et al., 
2018). Some auditors at the Chamber agreed to audit them. They faced major obstacles. The TAD’s 
accounts lacked the source documents necessary for an audit, and the Chamber remained in a ‘very 
pitiful state’ with few resources (e.g., office space), “to receive the documents should the TAD 
provide them” [CC001] (Akakpo, 2010). Consequently, the auditors conducted the assignment 
onsite at the TAD. A former President of the Chamber recalled how: 
                                                          
19 Constitution, article 134. 
20 Benin is a member of the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africain (UEMOA) (West African Economic 




When we started … at the TAD, the documents they provided were such that we could hardly exploit 
them. Worst still, they shuffled the documents and put them in a chaotic order in a large hall… and they 
gave us a key for the hall. But we realized that although we locked the door when we finished our work 
for the day and left, other people still went in the hall behind us, which means that they had another key. 
So, the following day we noticed that all the documents including those already examined were shifted 
and mixed up again, so every day we had to start over again… After some time we gave up… They 
made it impossible for us. So the attempt failed… Since then, no other attempt has been made [CC001] 
In 2000-2002, after further donor pressure, led by the WB, performance audits by the Chamber of 
Accounts and programme budgeting were introduced (2002 WB note), despite the WB previously 
claiming the Chamber lacked the capacity for this task. Nevertheless, auditors at the Chamber 
devised a plan for doing this but the WB insisted that they followed “the programme budgeting 
approach by the governments of Canada and Quebec”, and its “best practices” (2002 WB note). 
Because a programme’s performance relied on annual budget execution reports, the Chamber and 
the ministries shared responsibility for performance audits. A 2006 WB note stated that, “the pace 
at which the Chamber of Accounts examines government accounts [the Projets de Loi de 
Règlement] is slow and leads to significant delays in the transmission of the draft budget out-turn 
to the Parliament”. Despite subsequent improvements, ministries stopped producing performance 
reports (Akakpo, 2009, 2010). Yet, government auditors had welcomed the WB’s 
recommendations for they incorporated training abroad for up to one year, and French influence 
remained significant. An auditor commented:  
“We all went to … France for training … first to the French Court of Accounts to equip ourselves with 
the required technical tools for the work. And then to the Chamber of Accounts of Orleans… [and] 
many other Chambers of Accounts in France. But with the Chamber of Accounts of Orleans, we have a 
real partnership and we even had French magistrates from there come to Benin to train us.” [CC001]  
Interviewees at the Chamber valued their training in Canada and France as it signaled their 
superiority, brought ‘respect’ [CC004] and status with the primordial public, and helped legitimize 
their roles, but the training and reforms brought little benefit.  
The changes were largely cosmetic responses to demands from donors and civil society. They did 
not significantly affect public officials’ attitude toward corruption and their unwillingness to create 
effective accounting institutions to remedy this (Akakpo, 2009; Lassou, 2017). As before, 
politicians collaborated with civil servants to nullify the Chamber’s auditing initiatives. The fate 
of the UEMOA directive was sealed by the civic public’s amorality. Even the late President, 
Mathieu Kérékou, conceded that “several Ministers in his team enriched themselves with public 
money” (Adoun & Awoudo, 2008, p. 31). Adoun & Awoudo (2008) list multi-billion dollars’ 
worth of examples. For instance, in 1999, Benin’s national fuel distribution company, SONACOP, 
worth about CFA49 billion (US$98 million), including CFA37 billion cash (US$74 million) was 
sold under obscure circumstances for CFA16 billion (US$32 million) to Continentale de Pétroles 
et Investissements, whose owner was a friend of the President. Embezzlements in the General 
Accounts of the Financial Administration and Draft Budget out-turn for 1999 and 2000 exceeded 
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CFA115 billion (US$230 million). This excluded proceeds from other corrupt acts, e.g. in public 
procurement (African Development Bank, 2005).  
6. Amorality and legitimacy: 2006-2018 
[Insert figure 1 near here] 
6.1 The resuscitation of the IGE  
In 2006, under donor and civil society pressure (Eyebiyi, 2010), rather than reforming the Chamber 
of Accounts, the newly elected President, Yayi Boni, re-established the IGE as “a powerful 
institution” [CS003]. Figure 1 traces the reporting lines of Benin’s major government audit 
institutions thus created and remain today. The IGE is solely responsible to the President.22 It 
became responsible for audits in central and local governments, public enterprises, and other 
matters, such as special investigations and fact-finding missions.23 This was similar to the SAI’s 
mandate, though only the SAI could audit budget draft out-turns and make the “judgement [i.e. 
certification or not]” [CC001] of public accounts. The President claimed he wanted an institution 
‘close to him’ [IG004] to promote “good governance [and] a sound management of public finances 
and… to fight against corruption and economic and financial crimes,”24 especially by, “embezzlers 
and the looters of the economy” [CSO01]. However, several interviewees saw it as a ruse to avoid 
converting and rendering the established SAI, the Chamber of Accounts, functional. A senior 
Chamber of Account’s auditor commented:  
“The President knew that Benin was one of the last UEMOA member countries yet to comply with 
UEMOA requirement… [to create] a Court of Accounts with more independence and adequate 
provisions as a SAI… He promised to do it if he wins the [2006] elections. When he assumed power, 
what did he do? He created the IGE and gave them all the resources they needed. Within a short period 
they were provided with about forty auditors, while the Chamber of Accounts … had only ten or twenty 
if we add the assistant-auditors [CC001].”  
To appease growing pressure for a functional Chamber of Accounts Benin’s politicians reformed 
the IGE in 2015.25 26 Its proponents claimed corruption was the “sole threat to the country’s 
development … good governance is not an option, it is a must;” and directed it to tackle “frauds, 
contract inflation and other acts of poor governance.”27 To its credit, the IGE uncovered ‘small 
fraudsters and embezzlers’ [CSO02], and ‘unmasked’ [CSO06] some opposition members, which 
produced, ‘a lot of noise, some showoff actions’ [CSO01] but, as a senior official from an advocacy 
NGO wryly intimated, this was primarily to gain legitimacy (African Minds, 2016): 
                                                          
22 Article 8, decree N.2006-627. 
23 Decree No.2006-319 – 04/12/2006 
24 See: ORTB news of 22 June 2015: http://news.acotonou.com/h/62579.html [Accessed 27/04/2018]. 
25 Decree No.2015-394 
26 In 2016, the IGE was reformed again and became Bureau d’Analyse et d’Investigation (i.e., Bureau of Analysis 
and Investigation, following a new President being elected (decree No.2016-366). 
27 See: La Nation of 22 July 2015: http://news.acotonou.com/h/66289.html [Accessed 28/04/2018]. 
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“There is a lack of will to fight corruption through institutions, such as the Chamber of Accounts… But 
under donors’ and civil society pressure, they [politicians] want to show that they are doing something. 
That’s what they do with the IGE. It has always been like that in this country. These are artifices that 
they use as political tools. The institution [IGE] is used to conduct audit investigations… but only the 
President knows what is done and uses it for what he wants. It is to bypass the Chamber of Accounts … 
The results of such investigations are used to blackmail the opposition and sometimes his own followers 
to ensure their loyalty. There is no real will to go for a sound management of public finances for the 
public interest.” [CSA03] 
A senior IGE official acknowledged that, “it is normal he [the President] uses it [the IGE] however 
he wants” [IG003]. Critics claimed it was established to consolidate the President’s political and 
economic power. Although the IGE produced “fifty major audit and investigation reports which 
were transmitted to the President … very few resulted in any action from the government in terms 
of follow-up or sanctions” (2015, IGE note). Several corruption scandals were identified but no 
reports went to any anti-corruption agencies or the Justice Department to instigate prosecutions. 
Instead they often became “blackmail tools to obtain the political allegiance of certain actors 
including public directors, local political leaders or businessmen” (African Minds, 2016, p. 72). A 
minister who uncovered a corruption dossier of a predecessor sent it to the Justice Department, 
believing ‘that was the right thing to do’, was imprisoned for doing so. A public enterprise director 
who declined requests to make fraudulent disbursements suffered a similar fate (ibid).  
6.2 A weakened SAI 
Meanwhile the Chamber of Accounts remained ineffective. In 2007, it was mandated to audit the 
campaign expenses of election contestants,28 but for the 2015 parliamentary election, “only 5 out 
of 20 political parties or alliances … submitted their campaign accounts and the audit reports 
issued bore little resemblance to excessive campaign spending” (Damiba & Badet, 2016, p. 210). 
This brought public criticism of the Chamber for not seeing the obvious.29 A former President of 
the Chamber excused this stating, “how many are we to do the job? …I even suggested that this 
mission [control of campaign expenses] should be taken away because the way it is conducted 
makes it meaningless.” [CC001] The exercise was ceremonial and pointless (Damiba & Badet, 
2016) as the Chamber lacked resources.30  
In 2011, political leaders and senior public officials were required to declare their property at the 
beginning and end of their public office and justify differences. The law31 stated that the Chamber 
of Accounts and the Appeal Court should inspect these and initiate prosecutions if they suspected 
any illicit enrichment. However, four years later, only one Minister upon taking office and five 
MPs of the seventh legislature have made a declaration: all 83 MPs of the sixth legislature and 
thousands of other public officials did not do so either (Autorité Nationale de Lutte contre la 
Corruption, 2015). The few declarations made were not audited because ‘Auditors at the Chamber 
                                                          
28 Law No.2004-07 (article 46). 
29 See: La Nation of 22 July 2015: http://news.acotonou.com/h/66289.html [Accessed 28/04/2018]. 
30 See, http://recef.org/wp-content/uploads/42_AKAKPO.pdf [Accessed 15/06/2019]. 
31 Law n° 2011-20, article 4. 
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of Accounts don’t have the skills to conduct such an audit… and the law to outline how to do it has 
not been issued’ [CSO003]. 
Parliamentary scrutiny and authorization of government budgets remained slight (Adoun & 
Awoudo, 2008; Cour Suprême, 2009; Akakpo, 2009). In 2014, a new Organic Law32 mandated 
the Chamber of Accounts to audit the 2013 Projet de Loi de Règlement and send their report to 
Parliament, after donors made aid conditional on Parliamentary budget out-turn approvals. The 
Ministry of Finance granted the Chamber extra resources, but they could not complete the task. In 
2015, donors reiterated their demands and eventually, the Chamber sent their audit to Parliament. 
It lacked detail. A senior government auditor acknowledged that, “We only did what we could” 
[CC003], and a WB official added that, “they cleared the backlogs but there is no … quality in 
what they did” [DON01]. In October 2015, Parliament approved the Lois de Règlements from 2009 
to 2013 (Damiba & Badet, 2016, p. 71). Their summary report examination was cursory as the 
Parliament examined all five years’ accounts simultaneously because “the structure of the accounts 
of each fiscal year is identical”33 (President of Parliament’s Finance Commission). It followed the 
letter of the law but not the substance. Damiba & Badet (2016) likened Parliament’s control of the 
executive’s budget to ‘barking’ with no impact on government wrongdoing. Consequently, 
according to a former senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts:  
“There is a disastrous management of public resources. Nowadays, the authorization is no longer 
necessary to execute public revenue and expenditures… the budget does not mean anything in the logic 
that develops within our administration… corruption, don’t mention it… [including] direct withdrawal 
of cash.” [CC006]  
Currently, the Chamber of Accounts “does not cover 1/10th of its mandate” (Damiba & Badet, 
2016, p. 51) and, according to a senior auditor, 
“It only examines about 40/1,000th of reports [i.e. 4%] expected per year… Those in charge of managing 
public affairs don’t have the will to make things work… so that they can take advantage of the chaos. It 
is a system that is maintained by the highest levels of the public sector: the legislature, the judiciary and 
the executive.” [CSO03]  
The government claimed that the Constitution34 stipulated that any reform of the Chamber of 
Accounts required a constitutional amendment. Previous attempts to amend the constitution to 
lengthen the President’s tenure of office had failed due to popular ‘anti-revision’ campaigns35 
(Jeune Afrique, 2018). A senior NGO official explained how this, 
“… started with the late President Kérékou [1996-2006] … He wanted to increase the number of 
terms… and that brought an outrageous anti-revision campaign… Similarly, a campaign was organized 
                                                          
32 Law No.2013-14 (2013) 
33 See: La Nouvelle Expression of 12 October 2015: http://news.acotonou.com/h/70619.html [Accessed 19/06/2018]. 
34 Articles 52, 99 and 112. 
35 See: Jeune Afrique of 06 July 2018: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/589371/politique/benin-le-parlement-soppose-
a-nouveau-a-la-revision-de-la-constitution/ [Accessed 12/08/2018]; Beninwebtv of July 2018 
https://beninwebtv.com/2018/07/benin-nouvel-echec-de-la-revision-constitutionnelle-une-pilule-amere-pour-les-pro-
revisionnistes/ [Accessed 12/08/2018]. 
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against the revision proposal by Yayi [2006-2016]. He had a good proposal, but he wanted to hang onto 
power even though his official statement was ‘I don’t want to stay’… With Talon [the incumbent 
President], it was practically a parliamentary vote buying … The document submitted by a group of 
experts commissioned and paid millions of our francs was modified, fiddled. So the constitutional 
revision proposal finally submitted was not what the experts proposed… Thanks to the vigilance of 
some people … the proposal would have passed with massive corruption. One cannot want to revise a 
public document for the good of the population and put in money to corrupt those involved to pass it… 
You can ask whether we have evidence... Those who were corrupted disclosed36 it in the end.” [CSO02] 
When in 2018, another constitutional revision attempt failed in Parliament, the government 
claimed widespread support amongst MPs warranted another referendum. They attached the 
creation of a Court of Accounts to the revision to increase its appeal. The former Constitutional 
Court President claimed this was unnecessary as it was merely executing a UEMOA decision: 
“The code of transparency in the management of public finances in the UEMOA zone stipulates that 
public finances and related policies are subjected to the external control by the Court of Accounts. The 
[creation of] the Court of Accounts is therefore in compliance with a requirement of a regional 
integration organization (of which Benin is member). We don’t need a referendum to create the Court 
of Accounts… The judicial statute of the proposal to create a Court of Accounts constitutionally in 
Benin is not the same for the judicial statute of a simple revision proposal. I am deeply saddened that 
the question of the Court of Accounts is part of the referendum.”37 
When this constitutional revision failed due to popular condemnation, the government blamed the 
opposition for blocking the creation of a Court of Accounts (Jeune Afrique, 2018). It remained 
unreformed, within the judiciary [allegedly the second most corrupt institution in Benin 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012)], and starved of resources, while the IGE was well resourced 
and staffed by government nominees. A senior government auditor commented, “It is a political 
choice. The IGE is an institution in the hands of the President that allows him to conduct 
opportunist control to showoff… which is not the case for the Chamber of Accounts… He placed 
his henchmen at the head of this institution [the IGE] to use it as he wishes.” [CC003]  
A WB official summarized the amorality of the civic public, its disconnection with primordial 
groups, and its ramifications for the SAI thus, 
“When people assume power, at the end of the day, they do what is in their interests. They are not there 
primarily for the public interest. Don’t be fooled into believing that… The control institutions are weak, 
especially the Chamber of Accounts. It is not by chance. They want to keep staying in power … You 
want them to do things that would work against themselves, against their own interests? That’s not 
possible… So they create confusion, they create a mess and within that mess everyone finds something 
                                                          
36 Rosine Soglo, the senior MP in Parliament, confirmed that MPs “received money” including herself to pass the 
constitutional revision. See: RFI of 05 April 2017: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170404-benin-parlement-refuse-
examiner-projet-revision-constitutionnelle [Accessed 25/07/2017]. 
37 See: La Nouvelle Tribune of 14 July 2018: https://lanouvelletribune.info/2018/07/benin-me-robert-dossou-on-na-
pas-besoin-de-referendum-pour-creer-la-cour-des-comptes/ [Accessed 12/08/2018]. 
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to ‘eat’. … There are technical problems, but they are submerged by political considerations, people 
scramble everything to create confusion, and the [technical] problems are not solved.” [DON01] 
6.3 The exercise of tribalism, the colonial legacy and popular toleration of corruption 
Our research found evidence of neopatrimonialism but the illicit diversion of public resources to 
this end was slight compared to that going to civic public members. The origin of 
neopatrimonialism, as Ekeh claims, lies in the colonial experience that brought modern tribalism.38 
Its corollary is the civic public members’ treatment of public office. Many interviewees believed 
leaders should favour people from their regions and/or tribe and when power shifts, new 
incumbents should do likewise. For example, according to a former auditor, in the early 2000s a 
new Chamber of Account’s President from a different ethnic group than his predecessor, exercised 
tribalism: 
“Because I am not from the North, he didn’t want to nominate me… We were three including himself 
that met the conditions and there were four positions, and then he was nominated President of the 
Chamber. Then, he nominated the second one, who was from the same region, as President of the Second 
Section … [and] in order not to nominate me, he accumulated the other three positions for himself.” 
[CC005] 
However, the auditor accepted this as legitimate and told the President, “It is your right… I am not 
complaining.” [CC005], though he subsequently left the Chamber.  
Many civil society interviewees knew this had a negative impact but they claimed that amorality 
and occasional tribalism in public office was widely accepted as normal and legitimate as the 
following quotations illustrate: being a ‘good’ civic public member depends on their ability to 
“build a fortune” in terms of, “the number of houses… the number of cars, the number of their 
children and siblings schooled overseas… all funded from their function in the government. You 
get into the government to make money, to fill up your personal coffers… That is the general 
perception.” [CSO02]; ‘When you accede public office, you face mounting pressure to make 
fortune’ [CSO001]; ‘You cannot have been a Minister and not enrich yourself… That’s our 
conception, and it is not just those who are illiterate from a lower class, it is the same attitude for 
the literate ones’ [CSO003]; people would be ‘shocked’ [CSO01] if someone within the first 
months of assuming a government position had not laid the foundation of “a multi-level building” 
[CSO02] and did not drive ‘a new four-by-four car’ [CSO01]; ‘some people have occupied high 
public offices … and did so with probity … they did not use their position … to enrich themselves… 
but these people are often mocked. People say they are idiots, you cannot have been a Minister 
and not have [big] cars [for example].” [CSO003]; and, “It is not necessarily the merit that one 
looks at… [if] you are at a position where you can influence the outcome of a test [or a nomination] 
                                                          
38 Modern tribalism, as opposed to the traditional one which refers to people of the same ethnicity or group, has 
been extended to refer to people from regional area such as the South or the North, where there are many 
traditional ethnic groups. Modern tribalism refers to the division between regional groups created by the colonial 
practices and treatment of indigenous groups that transcend into post-colonial social, religious, and political life of 
many African societies.  
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and you have a ‘parent’ from your village, your region and you know him and you don’t let him 
through… people [from your village or region] won’t believe it.” [CSO06] Even a civil society 
activist acknowledged their vulnerability to pressure from family and friends to do likewise: ‘the 
pressure is there, I have friends who would ask me favours; and that is why I am not aspiring for 
any high public office … the way I feel, it will be difficult for me to resist. I won’t hide it to you’ 
(CSO003]. Thus, “honesty is not a virtue but an imbecility to which only idiots cling” (Adoun & 
Awoudo, 2008, p. 48). A former Minister, Ganiou Soglo, stated that “people don’t like virtuous 
men in Benin. You are given consideration when you know how to steal with confidence [in public 
office]” (Damiba & Badet, 2016, p. 34). 
There were isolated exceptions. A Beninese working in a donor office recounted how most 
mornings his hometown mayor received and resolved personal issues of community members by 
paying for medicines, school fees, and food, though he acknowledged this was unusual. A civil 
society official recounted how an MP from a Northern region gets elected: ‘He built some houses 
by the University of Abomey-Calavi [in the South] and lodges some of the students from Matéri, 
Cobli, and Tanguiéta [i.e. Northern towns]… and during elections he makes them campaign for 
him in those towns… other politicians do similarly’ [CSO006].  
Some interviewees linked citizens’ reluctance to make the civic public accountable to beliefs that 
public resources are the property of public office holders who are ‘benefactors’ that present public 
goods as gifts like the colonial masters (Huillery, 2014). For example, a former MP commented: 
‘Anyone [i.e. citizen] here would tell you that Yayi Boni [former President] has built a road – is it 
him who built roads with his money?’ [AN001]. A former MP and Finance Committee member 
added: 
“People think that public resources do not belong to the individual citizens, so they [i.e. public servants] 
can use them as they want and no-one should ask them to account… So when you trust them with public 
money to do something, they don’t do anything and all the money disappears … The common saying is 
that you can’t ask someone to prepare some sauce and prevent them from tasting it. Thus, people find 
it normal that the one in charge of state resources uses those resources for themselves, not for public 
goods.” [BAN02]. 
A government official elaborated this: 
“The colonizer gave our people a sense of charity regarding public money whenever they did something 
for them and never gave them the notion of responsibility when it comes to handling public resources… 
Whenever they built something for the public it was presented as if it was a favour, not that it was done 
with public monies… They never gave accounts to the citizens. So they [citizens] don’t believe that it 
is an obligation for our leaders to give accounts.” [GOV01] 
This is understandable from a citizen perspective. In the local context, and probably more 
generally, it is unacceptable for the receiver of a ‘gift’ to request the giver or benefactor to account 
for what is being given. Instead, the expectation is an expression of gratitude by the recipient. 
Thus, say upon building a school or a community health centre, community members often praise 
the government or local authorities rather than asking for details on resources employed and 
whether the outcomes adequately reflect their cost. An interviewee illustrated this: ‘Yayi Boni 
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[former President] is paid millions [of our currency] to build infrastructures… He built some 
roads and people went on a march to thank him.’ [CSO006] 
Some interviewees linked citizens’ unwillingness to make politicians accountable to continuing 
traditional beliefs about authority. For example, a former MP claimed that: 
“Our cultural and traditional ways of doing things have transcended into our mode of governance… and 
accounting… and this facilitates poor governance … It is understood that the traditional Chief, the king, 
owns everything in the state…[Yet] he ensures fair allocations of resources. [So] no-one asks him to 
account… People confound elected officials with traditional Chiefs and find it normal not to ask them 
to account. Those who dare to ask … are seen as against the officials… It is a cultural phenomenon that 
prevents the citizen to understand that it is public money that [the political leaders] spent and should be 
asked to account” [AN001]. 
A retired government official attributed the roots of tribalism in Benin’s public administration to 
the colonial regime. Then those selected for school and placed in key administrative positions 
came mostly from the South, and they governed their Northern counterparts, often unfairly.39 Most 
public facilities and infrastructures were built and developed in the South, albeit unevenly. 
However, when France granted independence, the French shifted power to Northerners. The 
message was, as an interviewee claimed: “you have been deprivileged, disadvantaged for a long 
time… now it is your turn. Do to them the same.” [GOV01]. Today, although civil society 
organisations complain that regionalism or tribalism goes beyond the notion of ‘son of the region’, 
it remains a political instrument in elections (Damiba & Badet, 2016, p. 25), albeit exercised 
frugally. For example, some interviewees claimed that during the last Presidential elections, people 
from Southern areas voted for the incumbent President, not because they were from the same 
‘traditional’ ethnic group, but because they identified themselves and those around the President 
as ‘Southerners’. When a leader assumes power, s/he is expected to rectify ‘injustices’ by 
prioritizing their region at the expense of others, and so the process continues. Ekeh (1975, p. 98) 
labels this ‘divide et impera’ (divide and rule) “to create disharmony between groups”, which helps 
justify interventions by the former colonial power, not least to keep order (Verschave, 1998).  
However, the civic public often uses tribalism as a cloak for self-enrichment rather than benefiting 
their tribe (Verschave, 1998; 2000). For example, Abomey, the hometown of the first Beninese 
President in the current democratic era, remains one of the poorest cities in Benin.40 A senior 
official from a major civil society organization explained: 
“Sadly, the public is powerless… The leaders enrich themselves and don’t care about the general 
public… not even where they come from [i.e. hometown]. The institution created to do something about 
it [the SAI] is not really fit for it… If you want, you can go to the village of some of them [politicians] 
and see for yourself. Schools: the quality of teachers, the infrastructure [is poor], but the guy is amassing 
a fortune and doesn’t care… All they do is distribute money in election time.” [CSO01] 
Another NGO official commented, “You don’t have to go far to see the effects of the prevarication, 
the looting of public funds by the leaders… It doesn’t spare anyone... Housing problems, power 
                                                          
39 Like the Kenyan experience under British colonization (Leys, 1975). 
40 See for e.g.: https://www.insae-bj.org/images/docs/insae-publications/autres/Note-sur-la-
pauvrete/Note%20sur%20la%20pauvrete-final.pdf [Accessed 30/06/2019]. 
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[i.e. electricity], unemployment, water to drink. It is worse when you go to the villages.” [CSO03]. 
Contrary to Ekeh’s analysis, this study found little systematic connection between the civic 
public’s wealth and their primordial groups’ wellbeing. Attributing Benin’s civic public’s 
amorality just to tribalism is an oversimplification. Most leaders (including former Presidents) are 
rich while their former communities remain poor. 
6.4 The powerful external public 
Apart from the 1990 new Constitution in the heady days of the new democratic regime, and despite 
politicians frequently proclaiming the need to curb corruption, most government accounting 
reforms, including the structure and role of the SAI, followed international financial institutions 
and donors (labelled here as the external public) making them a condition for financial aid. A 
former Chamber of Account’s President commented,  
“Almost all reforms undertaken in public financial management are driven by donors… It has become 
the song of the government when we need to do something. Too bad! It is unfortunate… The vote of 
the Loi de Règlement is because they requested it… My own nomination was because of them 
[including] the African Development Bank…; the first computers for the Chamber were donated by the 
USAID [United State Agency for International Development] … our training in France was funded by 
the Government of the Netherlands.” [CC001].  
However, changes were largely cosmetic and only partially or not implemented. A civil society 
interviewee commented, 
“They are very ingenious. Since they don’t want to do it [i.e. the Chamber of Accounts auditing the 
Projet de Loi de Règlement and report to Parliament] but need to demonstrate to donors that they 
do, so they bury that reform by provisions that nullify it and advance the hidden political agenda 
of the president.”[CSO01]  
The civic public’s SAI strategy has paid off. For example, when the government linked the creation 
of a Court of Accounts to other Constitutional reforms, donors appeared to accept this. For 
instance, a donor official commented that, “progress has been achieved, the examination of the 
Projets de Loi de Règlement by the Chamber of Accounts and the Parliament is up to date.”, so 
they released their budget support claiming that, “they [i.e. politicians] are receptive to the reform 
[i.e. the creation of the Court of Accounts]… but the political climate has not been favourable.” 
[DON03]. Similarly a WB official claimed, “the government is making some efforts in the area of 
corruption … [with for example] the IGE’; a GIZ official commented, ‘the IGE’s work is in the 
control of corruption’; and an IMF country report noted “progress in fighting corruption in Benin” 
(IMF, 2018:10) despite acknowledging that reforms of audit institutions, particularly the SAI, have 
lagged. Thus, donors have been broadly satisfied, though a WB official conceded that, “if we did 
not include such conditionalities [i.e. regarding the Loi de Règlement] in our budget support we 
would not have achieved the progress.” [DON01].  
 
6.5 Civil Society 
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Nevertheless, the primordial public’s toleration of the civic public’s corruption was not universal 
and may be waning, as is evident in anti-corruption campaigns, and successive presidents making 
curbing corruption central in election campaigns. Such dissatisfaction may be due to unrequited 
expectations of neopatrimonialism oriented to tribalism, or simply revulsion at the scale of 
corruption. Civil society in Benin has become more active in political affairs and more effective 
than the government in uncovering corruption cases.  
A 2017 civil society consortium note stated that “fighting corruption begins with the obligation to 
give accounts” but “the financial jurisdiction [i.e. the SAI] has not been reformed adequately … 
thus, none of its missions has been effectively carried out”. The leading local NGO network, 
FONAC, has prominently campaigned against corruption and identified “new corruption scandals 
worth several billions [of local currency]”41 (i.e. millions of US dollars) involving fake overseas 
missions and fake or inflated invoices/receipts. Support and protection from the external public 
has been important to domestic NGOs. For example, the President of FONAC acknowledged that 
without the Netherland’s forceful pressure regarding a water and sanitation project they funded, 
no-one would know about the scandal that made the government commission an investigation.42 
Similarly, USAID works with local government leaders, civil society leaders, journalists, and 
students to raise awareness of high-level corruption, and to reduce the legal impunity of 
perpetrators.43 During a news conference in August 2019, two major civil society groups – 
ALCRER and Social Watch Benin – concluded that corruption is ‘systemic, trivialized and 
tolerated’ in Benin.44 Many civil society interviewees claimed that the establishment of a special 
court by the current government to tackle corruption had helped reduce petty but not high profile 
corruption: ‘we have the impression that those involved in petty corruption have refrained a bit, 
but we are not sure about grand corruption or that the amount of corruption has gone down… 
because those who are in power are very smart and very astute. They are not virtuous, and they 
steal too’ [CSO006] 
The major press and media outlets are under government control, but some newspapers have 
reported major scandals. For example, in 2018 when the Ministry of Sustainable Development 
bought 84 motorbikes, L’Evènement Précis claimed the prices paid exceeded six times their market 
price.45 Newspaper headlines have proclaimed how institutions charged with remedying 
corruption are failing, e.g., ‘fight[ing] against corruption in Benin: a real folklore’ (African Minds, 
2016) and “Corruption, clientelism, nepotism, prevarication, insider trading ... the governance of 
public finances [in Benin] has become hopeless in recent years” (Fraternité).46 A civil society 
                                                          
41 See, La Nouvelle Tribune of 18 November 2014: http://www.lanouvelletribune.info/benin/21956-benin-jean-
baptiste-elias-denonce-de-nouveaux-scandales-de-plusieurs-milliards [Accessed 09 November 2015] 
42 See, : https://oceanfm.info/jean-baptiste-elias-au-sujet-de-laffaire-ppea-ii-yayi-doit-sortir-les-autres-dossiers-de-
detournement/ [Accessed 09/11/2015]. 
43 https://www.usaid.gov/benin/anti-corruption (accessed 3/11/2019. 
44 See: https://www.les4verites.bj/des-dossiers-de-alcrer-et-social-watch-devant-la-criet-et-des-tribunaux/ 
[Accessed 30/11/2019] 
45 See: L’Evenement Précis of 16 March 2018: http://levenementprecis.com/2018/03/16/exhortation-a-la-reprise-du-
travail-suite-aux-dernieres-negociations-le-gouvernement-lance-un-appel-republicain-a-tous-les-travailleurs-2/ 
[Accessed 14/07/2018]. 




interviewee commented that without civil society activism and media reporting, “no-one would 
know about it.” [CSO04].  
Protests, freedom of speech, and exercising change democratically were possible after 1990 but 
this is proving fragile. Governance achievements in Benin are under threat.47 Since his election in 
2016 as President, Mr. Talon, one of the 15 richest persons in Africa, known as the ‘King of 
Cotton’ after acquiring privatised corporations in the 1990s, allegedly through political 
connections, has failed to get Constitutional reforms passed to extend his presidency. Subsequently 
he appointed loyal officials mostly from his own region; closed prominent newspapers and 
television channels; banned opposition parties, with the Court’s approval despite it being allegedly 
unconstitutional; and jailed political opponents. In April 2019 he maintained power when only two 
parties supporting his government presented candidates for the parliamentary elections. The 
multitudinous small, often regional parties were unable or unwilling to pay a new and large levy 
to participate or were allegedly prevented by the Interior Ministry or the electoral Commission. 
Only 23% of the electorate voted (in previous elections it was circa 68%). Street protests were 
violently put down culminating in deaths. As Onuoha (2014) notes, transition in Africa is at the 
mercy of violent political crises. 
6.6 Continuing corruption 
According to GAN Integrity, corruption permeates most governmental sectors – they rated the 
customs and tax administrations, the police, the judicial system, and public procurement as very 
high risk and public administration as high risk.48 The 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index from 
Transparency International gave Benin’s corruption score as 40 and ranked it 85th of 150 countries. 
Its lowest score (i.e. 77) was for 2004 and the highest (i.e. 121) in 2006. Since then it has decreased 
gradually and was 80 in 2019.49 Transparency International in 2014 commented, “Corruption 
permeates all levels of government operations, from daily interactions between citizens and low 
ranking civil servants to high level corruption schemes involving senior officials. Recent 
corruption scandals involving the highest members of government could potentially undermine the 
long-term credibility of the government’s anti-corruption efforts and citizens’ perceptions of its 
political will to effectively fight corruption.”50 Recently, at the National Days of Governance, the 
current President, Patrice Talon, claimed, “systematic and tolerated corruption has become 
embedded in Benin and is an obstacle to providing quality public services and reducing poverty... 
Weaknesses within the judiciary, the financial jurisdiction, and civil society are the root causes” 
(République du Benin, 2017:8).  
                                                          
47 See, Financial Times, 2019. https://www.ft.com/content/7fc32690-6bff-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d; New York 
Times of 4 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/04/world/africa/benin-protests-talon-yayi.html, and Africa 
Centre for Strategic Studies, May 19, 2019, The Testing of Benin’s Democracy By Mark Duerksen 
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/the-testing-of-benin-democracy/ 
48 www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/benin/ [Accessed 3/12/2019]. 
49 https://tradingeconomics.com/benin/corruption-rank, acccessed 14/08/2019. 




Yet the lack of a strong SAI and an integrated information system has meant customs officials51 
and “political officials” [CSO02] can collude in corrupt acts with impunity. A former TAD Head 
commented how, “customs revenue must go through another post [for clearing at the Presidency] 
before being recorded at the Treasury… That’s how it is done.” [TAD01] On television,52 a former 
Minister of Secondary Education described how government officials and businessmen diverted 
billions of tax revenue set aside for reconstructing public infrastructures and buildings across cities 
that would host the CEN-SAD53 summit. He said: 
“There is no financial year without financial scandals … the Francophonie conference – its organisation 
involved a lot of misappropriations. They [i.e. the government] did not follow the amounts that were 
budgeted. … MPs wanted to investigate whether the amounts spent on road constructions, city 
infrastructures building etc. had been as expected and accounted for. I was the rapporteur of the 
committee set up to conduct the investigation. But the investigation failed because we were unable to 
talk to anyone who spent the money. We could not even corroborate what we noted from hearsay … 
[For example], no-one can tell us today how much it cost to build the CIC [Centre for International 
Conference]”. 
Embezzlement is estimated to cost Benin US$1 billion annually (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2012). In the power sector for example, estimated losses from corruption range from CFA 5.4 
billion (US$10.8 million)54 to FCA 45 billion (US$90 million).55 As Ekeh (1975) concluded, the 
apex of civic public amorality is persistent corruption. A former senior auditor at the Chamber of 
Accounts commented, “Benin has reached such a level of rottenness today that I can hardly 
imagine how we can get out of it… No-one questions where the money comes from” [CC006]. 
Interviewees claimed that, “scandals … are numerous… and because the financial jurisdiction 
[i.e. the SAI] is not functional, people don’t know.” [CC006], and because the Chamber of 
Accounts is, “handicapped” [CC007], it is, “difficult to have reliable estimates of the size of 
corruption, embezzlements… fake procurement… and other corruption practices.” [CC006]. 
Secrecy has facilitated this because, according to an interviewee,  
“In Benin everything is confidential… Access to information is strictly controlled… Even the 
government budget is confidential… The Chief must not be controlled. …. The mechanisms for 
embezzlement and conflict of interest are put in place by the government … look at the scandals: 
procurement of agricultural equipment, PPEA II [procurement of safe water and sanitation56], Maria-
Gléta [a power project that became a white elephant57], you name it, all happening within the 
government… How do you expect the IGE which is under the command of the government to denounce 
its boss?” [CSO02].  
                                                          
51 Among the most corrupt in Benin (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012]. 
52 See, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=toSPwsFKaE0 [Accessed 21/12/2013]. 
53 Community of Sahel-Saharan States which includes: Benin, Burkina-Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Somalia, 
Mauritania, Chad, Soudan, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Togo, Tunisia, Guinea, Central African Republic, Egypt, 
Libya, Comoros Islands, Gambia and Eritrea. 
54 See: 24 Heures au Benin of 28 May 2015: https://24haubenin.info/?Yahouedehou-Okounlola-A-quand-la [Accessed 
17/05/2017]. 
55 See: Adjinakou of 9 December 2013: http://news.acotonou.com/h/12784.html [Accessed 17/05/2017]. 
56 See also, Lassou et al. (2018) 
57 See: Adjinakou of 9 December 2013: http://news.acotonou.com/h/12784.html [Accessed 17/05/2017]. 
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Benin’s weak business environment continues deters domestic and international investors – it 
ranks 153 out of 190 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business report.58 Despite annual GDP 
growth of 4 to 5% over the past decades, poverty has risen from 37.5% of the population in 2006 
to 40.1% in 2015.59 According to the French newspaper, Le Monde, when Benin’s incumbent 
President, Patrice Talon, met the French President, Emmanuel Macron, he acknowledged that 
“only a few people, including myself benefited from poor governance, and unethical practices.”60 
The diversion of public resources into private pockets has consequences. For instance, political 
and business officials misappropriated funds, partly from the Netherlands Government (circa 
US$16 million) to provide safe water and sanitation for poor rural communities left them without 
safe water.61 No political official involved was sanctioned, and the Minister cited by the audit 
report was cleared.62 He is now an MP. The reality remains essentially unchanged, corruption 
flourishes, and the audit institutions remain ineffective. Civic public amorality abounds. 
7.  Conclusions  
How did SAIs develop in Benin post-independence? Before granting Benin independence, the 
colonial power, France, created government accounting institutions, that later were split. One, the 
IGE, lay largely dormant until 2006. In 1966, upon French advice, the Chamber of Accounts was 
created within the Supreme Court and became the SAI. However, these institutions differed from 
those of France. Whatever, effective government accounting and auditing was minimal during a 
turbulent period of misrule and numerous political coups.  
1990 saw the restoration of a democratic regime, one of the most durable and effective in Africa. 
For example, following elections there were peaceful changes of Presidents. The new Constitution 
reaffirmed the Chamber of Accounts, still within the Supreme Court, as the SAI. It was charged 
with auditing government accounts and sending its reports to Parliament, the President and the 
public. However, progress was tardy and Parliamentary scrutiny cursory. Initially the SAI was 
staffed by lawyers with no accounting or auditing experience or qualifications. Given this, and 
their location in the Supreme Court, their work largely focused on legal interpretations. In 1992 
auditing positions were created and filled but no audits materialized as no government accounts 
were produced until 1998. In 1994 the regional organization, UEMOA, instructed its members to 
establish autonomous Courts of Accounts but Benin has not complied. The 2000 accounts were 
delayed, and a new team of qualified auditors tried to audit them, despite inadequate staff numbers 
and resources, but this was frustrated by some civil servants. When the President replaced the head 
                                                          
58 https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin/overview, accessed 14/1/2020. 
59 See: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/benin/overview [Accessed 15/07/2018]. 
60 See: Le Monde of 06 March 2018 https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/03/06/a-paris-le-president-beninois-
entre-mea-culpa-volonte-de-reforme-et-cooperation_5266454_3212.html [Accessed 14/07/2018]. 
61 See: RFI of 17 May 2015: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150517-benin-investiture-deputes-fond-scandale-
detournement-barthelemy-kassa-eau [Accessed 28/04/2018]; https://www.lanationbenin.info/index.php/actus/159-
actualites/11349-scandale-du-ppea-ii-le-bureau-de-l-auditeur-general-livre-la-substance-du-rapport-d-audit 
[Accessed 28/04/2018].  
62 See: RFI of 17 May 2017: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170517-benin-ancien-ministre-barthelemy-kassa-beneficie-
non-lieu [Accessed 28/04/2018]. 
28 
 
of the SAI with a loyal member of his tribe, the new head made appointments to the SAI using the 
same criteria. The auditors became demotivated and several left. Under WB pressure, performance 
auditing was introduced, based on a Canadian model, but the Ministries soon ceased producing 
performance reports, and government accounts were slow to materialize. Hence no performance 
audits ensued until 2015. Then five years (2009 to 2013) of government accounts, i.e. budget out-
turns (or Lois de Règlement), were rudimentarily audited and quickly passed in one tranche by 
Parliament. In 2011 the SAI was mandated to audit the property of politicians and public officials 
to identify possible corruption cases, but few made the necessary declarations, which were not 
audited. In 2018 the government attached the creation of a Court of Accounts to a Constitutional 
amendment seeking to lengthen the President’s term of office. The latter was unpopular, and the 
Constitutional revisions were rejected. Then the President’s allies blamed the opposition for 
blocking a Court of Accounts. In summary, the SAI has only discharged a small fraction of its 
mandate and its audits have been slight, partly due to insufficient resources and staff, politicised 
appointments, and the lack of documentation to audit.  
In 2006 the President resuscitated the IGE and gave it considerable audit and investigative powers. 
Many overlap with those of the Chamber of Accounts. The IGE is directly responsible to and 
controlled by the President. It was better resourced than the SAI. Critics claimed its formation was 
a façade to give an illusion of tackling corruption and to gain legitimacy. It has only investigated 
minor acts of corruption. Few prosecutions have materialised, though threats to do so were used 
to blackmail or gain the support of political opponents of the President. Allegations of large-scale 
embezzlements went uninvestigated.63 An institution formed to curb corruption created new 
avenues for the civic public’s amorality.  
Have the SAI and the IGE been effective, especially in curbing corruption? The answer is largely, 
“No”. To accommodate external pressure for government accounting reforms, partly to curb 
corruption, civic public members (e.g., politicians, government and public officials) complied 
symbolically to gain external legitimacy, whilst maintaining the status quo. If they failed to 
comply, they used diversion tactics that blamed the opposition and civil society groups. If they 
adopted the reforms, then the institutions were starved of resources or manned by cronies from the 
region of, and/or loyal to, the President. 
What is the nature and scale of corruption within Benin’s political and government institutions? It 
is considerable in scale and scope. Weak and ineffective government accounting and auditing has 
facilitated widespread corruption throughout many government institutions, e.g. the judiciary, 
public procurement, the police. Audit is just one cog in any anti-corruption strategy which is only 
as strong as its weakest link. The scale of corruption is not unique to Benin. It scores better on 
                                                          
63 See, for example, L’Evenement Précis of 02 June 2010: http://levenementprecis.com/2010/06/02/jean-baptiste-
elias-president-de-lobservatoire-de-lutte-contre-la-corruption-olc-sous-%C2%AB-larbre-a-palabres-%C2%BB-la-
corruption-na-pas-regresse-sous-le-changement/ [Accessed 30/07/2012]. 
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corruption indices than many other African countries, 64 e.g. see regarding Cameroon, Gabon, 
Ivory Coast and Togo in Joseph (1976); Martin (1995); Verschave (1998) and Verschave & 
Baccaria (2001).  
Does Ekeh’s thesis, especially regarding the lingering effects of colonialism, help explain this? 
Prior work on Benin’s government accounting used organizational hypocrisy and 
neopatrimonialism lenses to explain why accounting prescriptions and practices were decoupled 
(Lassou, 2017). These theories help explain manifestations of corruption, but do not fully capture 
the historical reasons why Benin’s auditing institutions, particularly the SAI, assumed the forms 
they did. Ekeh’s work helped link their emergence to Benin’s colonial experience and how post-
independence leaders reproduced its precepts. In Benin, like much of Africa, governance 
institutions, including SAIs, are a colonial legacy. Consistent with Ekeh (1975)’s analysis, Benin’s 
politicians scorned traditional forms of authority widely accepted by the primordial public, and 
followed French advice to establish a Chamber of Accounts as its SAI, i.e. they adopted Western 
legal-rational systems of governance deemed superior to gain legitimacy. On the other hand, 
governments took advantage of Parliament’s composition of MPs largely elected on regional, tribal 
or ethnic lines to opportunistically maintain colonial tribal divide and rule tactics, and to appear to 
be reciprocating tribal obligations and to gain political support. It is claimed that accounting can 
perpetuate ethnicity, racial identity, discrimination, and ensuing inequalities (Davie, 2005; Sian, 
2007). We found instances of this, e.g. regarding recruitment at the Chamber of Accounts, but 
there was no constant hierarchical order between ethnic groups. Tribalism occurred when a new 
ruler (often but not always the President) from a different group emerged, and it was used 
instrumentally – it did not permeate state activities as during colonialism (see Leys, 1975). 
Nevertheless, ethnic discrimination shaped accounting institutions and their role, often contrary to 
their formal and conventional function (Akakpo, 2009; Lassou, 2017).  
Neopatrimonialism (e.g. favouritism, nepotism, patronage, public resources predation) emerged to 
a limited degree (Cammack, 2007). However, the civic public’s amorality was largely self-serving 
and often detrimental to the primordial public generally and any tribes. This required further 
explanation for Ekeh’s two publics thesis links civic public members’ illicit enrichment to 
obligations to primordial groupings (Ekeh, 1975; Goddard et al., 2016). Nevertheless, we found 
support for Ekeh’s claim that the civic public’s corruption in the government sector is widespread 
and often deemed acceptable. Prior accounting research presents corruption as morally wrong, a 
‘deviance’ only accepted as a ‘norm’ by members of criminal circles (Courtois & Gendron, 2017; 
Neu et al., 2013; Bakre, 2007). However, many interviewees claimed that most primordial and 
civic public members deemed corruption in the government sector as legitimate, and attributed 
this to indigenous experiences during colonialism, as Ekeh claimed.  
Why is this so? Allegedly the civic public’s stealing of public resources has become embedded in 
popular social logics (Blundo & de Sardan, 2003). Some attributed this to lingering traditional 
                                                          
64 See: Courrier International of 14 May 2008: https://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2008/05/15/omar-
bongo-l-inamovible [Accessed: 30/08/2019]. 
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beliefs that leaders should favour their ethnic group or tribe. However, more interviewees 
attributed this to the colonial legacy (Lassou et al., 2019; Verschave, 1998). The former colonial 
power failed to imbue citizens with expectations of responsibility and accountability for public 
resources by public officials (Huillery, 2014; Verschave, 1998). Its actions fueled beliefs that the 
state is exploitative and distinct from everyday life and it presented public assets as gifts, not 
collective property generated from local taxpayers. This fed beliefs that the state’s resources are 
self-generated, infinite and thus free. Consequently, citizens believe that an office holder can use 
them at will with little obligation to account for them. Not doing so would appear nonsensical. 
Subsequently, many post-independence leaders have copied the colonial master and treated public 
resources as their private property. Given that citizens have never experienced governance that 
does not do this, it may be rational for electorates to return MPs from their region or tribe who 
may exercise modest neopatrimonialism, whilst enriching themselves. This has resulted in a 
Parliament with multitudinous small parties whose MPs are often corrupt and show little interest 
in curbing corruption or holding governments to account through audits of government accounts 
and control of the executive’s budget. In the current President’s defense, he would argue that this 
explains why he sought to eliminate small political parties, but this has damaged democracy and 
provoked civil unrest and failed to curb corruption, especially high-profile corruption. 
As others claim (Adebanwi, 2017; Osaghae, 2006), Ekeh’s thesis needed extension and updating. 
First, not all government officials, potentially members of the civic public are amoral. As some 
events described here and prior studies in Benin and Francophone Africa have shown, indigenous 
government accountants have instituted accounting and auditing reforms within national and local 
government accounting, that, inter alia, have curbed corruption, despite the difficult circumstances 
they confronted (Lassou et al., 2018, 2020). Benin has made some progress in government 
accounting, albeit falteringly, since independence, despite the civic public being slothful in making 
this materialize and devising strategies to nullify efforts towards such ends.  
Second, the increased activity of civil society, i.e. within the primordial public, has grown. 
Indigenous advocacy NGOs, especially those within FONAC, and non-government media outlets 
have been more successful than government agencies in revealing cases of corruption. Also, its 
control has been prominent in Presidential elections. Possibly due to greater education and 
urbanization the primordial public’s tolerance and expectation of the civic public’s amorality is 
declining. However, civil society activists confront asymmetries of power, e.g. the main media 
outlets are controlled by the government, and it can use its powers, ironically sometimes by using 
audit reports, to blackmail or persecute opponents. Moreover, civil society is fragile given local 
NGOs’ sometimes governance shortcomings and pursuit of self-interests. For example, the current 
FONAC bureau’s mandate expired in 2016 but until December 2019 they have not organized the 
required elections to elect a new bureau. Similarly, despite the National Integrity System requiring 
civil society organisations’ executives to declare their property, none have complied. Nevertheless, 
as Onuoha (2014) and Osaghae (2006) argue, the rise of civil society organisations needs 
incorporating into Ekeh’s analytical framework. 
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Third, the research found considerable evidence of the influence of the ‘external public’. Foreign 
governments and NGOs, and international financial institutions have exerted pressure on Benin, 
like other developing countries, to institute accounting reforms (Bierschenk et al., 2003, Hopper 
et al., 2017). Indigenous NGOs linked to foreign NGOs span the primordial and external publics, 
and foreign NGOs’ support for and protection to indigenous NGOs was vital. However, the leading 
instigators of government accounting and auditing reforms, the WB and the IMF and their local 
representatives, who often made reforms conditions for the aid or loans upon which Benin is 
dependent, realized that the political leaders’ responses were often symbolic, but they appeared 
unwilling to upset governments and tolerated a degree of poor governance. Whether this was to 
protect Western interests65 (foreign companies operate in almost every sector of Benin’s 
economy), or to be pragmatic about the feasibility of change could not be ascertained. 
Nevertheless, their proposed reforms have helped create a formal architecture of financial 
management, anti-corruption laws and institutions, Parliamentary control of the executive aided 
by a SAI, and computerized government accounting and performance management systems. Once 
legislated for and/or formally implemented the presumption appears to be ‘mission accomplished’ 
and that their aims will materialise. Or, knowing the amorality of the civic public, they hope that 
incremental but effective change may materialize and should less amoral governments emerge, the 
financial architecture is in place to tackle corruption. This may be reasonable for as Graaf et al. 
(2010) note, the causes of and remedies against corruption are multi-faceted. There is no ‘silver 
bullet’ and it takes time. Nevertheless, we question whether they could have achieved more by 
exerting greater pressure and more carefully monitoring how and whether these reforms operate 
as intended. Prior research chronicles a series of disappointing results of WB and IMF 
recommended reforms (Andrews, 2013; Moore, 2001), but we know little about how these are 
formulated and evaluated by WB and IMF officials locally and at their headquarters. How is their 
nexus of accounting knowledge, often accused of being ‘one-size-fits-all’ prescriptions, created? 
This needs more research. 
Our study is not without limitations. Much of the evidence rests on the perceptions of interviewees 
from an educated, urban elite, often committed to reforms to curb corruption, though many were 
members of and may still identify with the primordial public, and those from civil society 
organisations purport to represent it. Some may be corrupt but for obvious reasons be unwilling to 
admit to this. Also, they may be prone to attribute the catalogue of weak government accounting 
and auditing to others rather than personal failures. Nevertheless, their responses tally with 
research claims elsewhere (Blundo & de Sardan, 2003; Blundo et al., 2013, Lassou, 2017).  
To conclude, institutional arrangements; the amorality of political officials; and issues of tribalism 
to a lesser degree – results of the colonial legacy – have reduced auditing institutions to empty 
crates, which often facilitate rather than control corruption. Some civil society organizations and 
donors have attempted to redress this but the civic public has retained external legitimacy and 
continued budget support from donors through symbolic compliance, aided by the primordial 
public’s widespread acceptance of the civic public’s illicit exploitation of public funds (another 
                                                          




colonial legacy). Meanwhile, corruption, poverty and inequality rise, and, as recent events bear 
testament, any progress in curbing this by improved SAIs is fragile and prone to political 
repression. The dynamics of change are not linear and the impact of civil strife and political 
regimes post-independence needs incorporating into Ekeh’s framework of analysis. 
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Appendix 1: Acronyms  
EU  European Union 
FONAC Front des Organisations Nationales contre la Corruption (an anti-corruption 
coalition) 
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
IGE  Inspection Générale d'État (General Inspectorate of State) 
IGF  General Inspectorate of Finance 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
IPSAS  International Public Sector Accounting Standards 
MP  Member of Parliament 
NGO  Non-Government Organisation 
SAI   Supreme Audit Institution 
TAD  Treasury and Accounting Department  
UEMOA  Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africain (West African Economic and 
Monetary Union) 
UN  United Nations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 














Appendix 2: Profile of Interviewees 
 
  Chamber of Accounts Duration (minutes)     Civil Society Organisations 
Duration 
(minutes) 
CC001 Former President of Chamber of Accounts 131   CSO01 
Senior official at Social 
Watch Benin 107 
CC002 Auditor at Chamber of Accounts 68   CSO02 Senior official at FONAC 114 
CC003 Senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts 52   CSO03 Senior official at ALCRER 96 
CC004 Auditor at Chamber of Accounts 71   CSO04 Official at Social Watch Benin 66 
CC005 Former senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts 90   CSO05 
Official at Social Watch 
Benin 66 
CC006 Former senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts 47   CSO06 
Official of an anti-corruption 
organisation 45 
CC007 Former senior auditor at Chamber of Accounts 60         
         Treasury & Accounting Department   
  IGE & IGF     TAD01 Former TAD Head 65 
IG001 Former IGE official 98   TAD02 Former senior official at TAD 50 
IG002 Former IGE official 84   TAD03 Senior Accountant at TAD 54 
IG003 Bureau d'Analyse et d'Investigation (new IGE) official 27         
IG004 Bureau d'Analyse et d'Investigation (new IGE) official 30     Government official   
IG005 IGF official 89   GOV01 Former government official 118 
IG006 IGF official 76         
IG007 IGF official 93     Parliament   
IG008 Former IGF official 85   AN001 Former MP, member of the Finance Committee 75 
              
  Donors           
DON01 World Bank official 64         
DON02 World Bank official (with regional experience) 58         
DON03 European Union official 60         
DON04 GIZ official 45         
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Appendix 3: Main primary documents accessed 
1999 Aide memoire regarding a discussion mission between the World Bank and the 
Government of Benin: ‘Mission de discussion PERC’ 
1999 World Bank aide memoire: ‘Appui et reforme budgétaires: Mission de préparation – 
PERC’ 
2000 Public Expenditure Reform Credit (PERC) protocol note regarding the introduction of 
performance audit at the Chamber of Accounts: ‘Protocole d’engagement à l’égard de la Banque 
Mondiale dans le cadre du PERC 2001’ 
2001 World Bank aide memoire: ‘Appui et reforme budgétaires: Mission de supervision du 
PERAC’ 
2001 World Bank aide memoire: ‘Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté - Cadre de Dépenses à 
Moyen-Terme: Supervision du Crédit d’Ajustement pour la réforme des dépenses publiques 
(PERAC)’ 
2002 World Bank PFM evaluation note: ‘Réforme du Système de Gestion des Dépenses 
Publiques: Etat des Lieux’ 
2002 World Bank aide memoire: ‘Mission d’appui à la réforme budgétaire dans le cadre du 
PERAC’ 
2002 World Bank aide memoire: ‘Reformer une administration centralisée pour améliorer le 
service public: Enjeux et Défis au Benin’ 
2015 IGE internal note: ‘Bilan critique des actions de l’IGE’ 
2016 Civil society organizations note: ‘Evaluation du Système National d’Intégrité du Bénin’ 
2017 Civil society organizations note: ‘Code de l’information et de la communication au Bénin 
L’intégralité de la proposition de loi rectificative du député Eric Houndété’ 
2017 Civil society organizations note: ‘Pourquoi la Cour des Comptes?’ 
Cour Suprême (2009) Rapport sur l’exécution de la loi de finances pour l’année 2005. Cotonou: 
Cour Suprême. 
Damiba, L. and Badet, G. (2016). Évaluation du Système National d’Intégrité du Bénin. Cotonou: 
Transparency International. 
European Union (2002) Mission d’évaluation de la qualité des données pour les indicateurs de 
performance au Bénin Union Européenne (PARE 2001). Luxembourg: European Union. 
Ian Davies Conseil (2001) La gestion de l’information sur la performance. Victoria: Ian Davies 
Conseil. 
Inspection Générale des Finances (2011) Rapport d’activités de l’Inspection Générale des 
Finances – Années 2010. Cotonou: IGF. 
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Data driven coding 
- Decoupling 
- Legal-rational bureaucracy  
Primary codes Main categories  
Theory driven coding 
- Civic public clientelism  
- Civic public patronage  
- Instrumentalization of accrued benefits 
to the primordial public 
- Primordial public’s attitude towards 
public goods & state resources 
- Reliance on western institutions 
- Primordial public’s acceptance of civic 
public’s corruption 
- Enduring corruption  
- Civic public’s self-enrichment  
- Civic public’s resistance to reform 
- Reform adoption  
- Veneer compliance  
Colonial legacy: Tribalism & 
neopatrimonialism 
Colonial ramifications 




- Civil society organizations & the 
primordial public 
- Control of corruption 
- External public 
